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1. The quarrel about information 31 
 32 
Information is the bread and butter of Cognitive Science and Neuroscience (CSN). Talk about 33 
information processing, control, storage and retrieval is abundant in explanations of how cognitive 34 
systems can perform specific tasks and enable agents to interact intelligently with their environment. 35 
Accordingly, one of the defining tasks of CSN is to describe the mechanisms through which 36 
information is conveyed, an enterprise that, if successful, allows us to understand, predict, simulate 37 
and intervene upon the cognitive capacities of real agents.  38 
 39 
The groundwork of the way information is understood by CSN today was laid by Shannon’s (1948) 40 
mathematical account of information, which made possible nothing less than digital communication. 41 
Simply put, Shannon’s theory defines information as entropy, which is the measure of average 42 
uncertainty of the selection of an encoded signal. The core idea of what became known as Shannon-43 
information is that the less uncertain the selection of the encoded signal is at its receiver, the more 44 
information the signal carries from its sender. Noise, on the other hand, permanently corrupts the 45 
signal, thus increasing entropy and diminishing information. To summarize, information is a matter 46 
of minimization of uncertainty. Thus, CSN takes the cognitive system to fundamentally receive and 47 
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process encoded signals in a way that minimizes uncertainty about their source, say, the distal causes 1 
that initiate cognitive processing.1  2 
 3 
It might seem straightforward that the converse of Shannon-information is representational content—4 
despite Shannon’s advertence that “[the] semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the 5 
engineering problem.” (1948, p. 379). Indeed, proponents of CSN typically—but not necessarily, or 6 
so we will argue—take the encoded signals processed by cognitive systems to carry information about 7 
their source, which implies that the signals display semantic content, i.e., they (non-metaphorically) 8 
tell the cognitive system something about its environment.2 Homunculus issues aside—if the signal 9 
tells something to the cognitive system, then something within the system is listening after all—a 10 
dominant idea behind CSN is that the outcome of information processing is the composition, 11 
manipulation and consumption of representational content. Patterns of neural activity, therefore, 12 
supposedly represent whatever gave rise to the cognitive acts of which they are a token, because they 13 
convey information about their distal sources.  14 
 15 
Two parallel research programs in cognitive sciences and psychology, however, challenge the 16 
theoretical tenability of the very notion of representational content, or at least the assumption 17 
according to which representational content is needed to explain all sorts of cognitive activity. On the 18 
one hand, Gibson’s (1979/2015) ecological psychology gave rise to a research program that identifies 19 
environmental variables, which are known as affordances, as directly (non-representationally) 20 
perceived by cognitive agents. On the ecological view, agents directly perceive possibilities of 21 
engagement with their immediate environment according to their specific bodily morphologies. On 22 
the other hand, the general outlines of what would later become known as enactivism were first 23 
presented by Varela and Maturana (1980) and later expanded by Varela, Thompson and Rosch 24 
(1991). Enactivists argue that cognition is not a matter of representing the environment, it is instead 25 
the active exploration of an environment by an organism, an activity that determines meaningful 26 
points of interest for the organism with specific systemic structures—an activity that is known as 27 
“sense-making”.  28 
 29 
The consolidation of both paradigms characterized the so-called Pragmatic Turn in the cognitive 30 
sciences (Engel et al., 2013)—and, given the shared rejection of pervasive representations in 31 
cognition and semantic notions more generally, pragmatically oriented views of cognition typically 32 
eschew traditional informational parlance. Gibson straightforwardly rejected that Shannon-33 
information could serve as perceptual information (1979/2015, pp. 231-232), given the 34 
communicative character of information in Shannon’s view. Perceptual information, for Gibson, is 35 
not communicative because it is direct, it cannot be a matter of translating the messages emitted from 36 
a source. A more critical stance towards semantic information has been developed recently by radical 37 
enactivists (Hutto & Myin, 2013). They claim that natural structures, such as patterns of neural 38 
activity, do not exhibit accuracy conditions, which is the defining trait of representational content—39 
whatever else representations turn out to be. What they call the Hard Problem of Content is the 40 
challenge of reducing structures with accuracy conditions to the physical world. Given that the 41 
promise of reduction has not been fulfilled, so their argument goes, the assumption that 42 
representational content is pervasive of all cognition turns out to be a matter of theoretical 43 
recklessness. They write:  44 
 
1 Shannon-information has become the cornerstone of the Predictive Coding paradigm (Clark 2012; Clark 2013; Friston 
2009; Hohwy 2013; Hohwy 2016), which is in its tracks to become the dominant one in CSN, given its promise of 
explaining a wide range of cognitive activities through the same set of rules. 
2 Importantly, Dretske (1981) criticized Shannon’s information theory precisely because it did not account for the 
semantic content of information in a more general sense. The criticisms from radical enactivism presented below are 
initially directed against teleosemantic theories of content/information in general, of which Dretske’s is a prime 
example—but, given the assumption by some adherents of CSN that encoded signals carry information about their source, 
the same criticisms apply to how information is sometimes conceived in CSN. 
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 1 
  Anything that deserves to be called content has special properties—e.g., truth, reference, 2 
implication—that make it logically distinct from, and not reducible to, mere covariance 3 
relations holding between states of affair. (2013, p. 67) 4 
 5 
Covariance is the relation of two or more states of affairs varying reliably or nomically, and if that 6 
relation holds, it does not follow that one state of affairs represents the other. It is one thing to say 7 
that smoke indicates fire, meaning that whenever there is smoke there is fire; it is another thing 8 
altogether to say that smokes says that there is fire, or stands for fire. And it is the former that grounds 9 
a scientifically respectful notion of information, one that evades the Hard Problem of Content. Hutto 10 
and Myin call it information as covariance. So, “if information is nothing but covariance then it is 11 
not any kind of content—at least, it is not content defined, even in part, in terms of truth-bearing 12 
properties” (2013, p. 67). Importantly, if two variables covary reliably, one can predict the value of 13 
a variable based on the value of the other (Anderson & Chemero, 2013). This kind of consideration 14 
casts a different light on what a deflationary notion of information may look like within the enactive 15 
paradigm: cognitive systems covary reliably with their environment, in a way that an external 16 
observer can observe, for instance, patterns of brain activity and predict their source, given the correct 17 
set of assumptions regarding the broader mechanisms that play a role in cognitive activity (bodily 18 
morphology and environmental display, for instance). According to this less contentious notion of 19 
information, cognitive systems are, to use a Gibsonian metaphor, “attuned” to their medium. 20 
 21 
Interestingly, criticism from the radically enactive camp is not directed solely to cognitivism, which 22 
is the philosophy underpinning the dominant view on CSN. They argue that Ecological Psychology 23 
and what they call Autopoietic Enactivism—Maturana and Varela’s original ideas regarding sense-24 
making and autopoiesis—end up smuggling representational content through semantic information. 25 
Despite Gibson’s emphatic rejection of representationalism and Shannon-information (at least for 26 
perception), his recurrent phrase “information pickup” puts its view under suspicion of covert 27 
representationalism: “no informational content is ‘picked up’ or ‘extracted from’ the world and then 28 
‘supplied’ to the user by sensory means” (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 73). For, if there is no informational 29 
content, so they might argue, there is nothing to be picked up by the cognitive system. More recently, 30 
discussing Tony Chemero’s (2009) account, which combines ecological psychology with dynamic 31 
systems theory, Hutto and Myin write that: 32 
 33 
  Chemero’s version of an ecological dynamical approach (…) remains committed to the 34 
language, if not the framework, of information processing. Some of Chemero’s ways of 35 
talking—when he speaks of the “pro-vision,” “use,” “gathering,” and “pickup” of 36 
information “about” affordances—are anathema to a nonrepresentational rendering of 37 
Gibson. (Hutto & Myin, 2017, p. 86). 38 
 39 
But as van Dijk, Withagen and Bongers (2015) argue, and Hutto and Myin acknowledge (2017, pp. 40 
86-87), this does not necessarily put radical enactivism at odds with ecological psychology. The key 41 
to reconcile both paradigms is to take the Gibsonian notion of information not as carrying content 42 
about the medium, but as offering possibilities of action for an agent, something that becomes clearer 43 
if we take seriously Gibson’s notion of affordance, as we will do in the following section. Following 44 
van Dijk, Withagen and Bongers, we call this view information for action. 45 
 46 
In this paper, we side with pragmatic views of cognition, for we reject pervasive representational 47 
content and semantical information as the basis of all cognition. But we part ways on the supposed 48 
relation between information as minimization of uncertainty and representational content—49 
Shannon’s idea was precisely that a quantitative account of information is independent of semantic 50 
issues. Thus, we offer an account of information as minimization of uncertainty without 51 
representational content. In Section 2 we start to present our view, turning to the notion of information 52 
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in ecological psychology in order to provide more details of a pragmatically oriented account of 1 
information, that is, information for action. We also show how this account of information offers an 2 
interesting opportunity to approximate ecological psychology to enactivism. Finally, we indicate that 3 
perceptual learning is a process of minimization of uncertainty, a point we will further develop in the 4 
last section based on the empirical literature. In Section 3 we intend, on the one hand, to capture the 5 
idea of reduction of uncertainty that underlies Shannon-information, but without implying 6 
representational content and, on the other, to be consistent with the idea of information for action. 7 
We argue that the agent’s cognitive system conveys information for acting in an environment by 8 
minimizing uncertainty about how to achieve the intended goals in that environment through skilled 9 
agency. This idea is compatible with enactivism for, as we show, can be cast in terms of information 10 
as covariance. We address the challenge of explaining how skilled agency, which is refined and 11 
reinforced through past interactions, can be adapted to deal with unforeseen circumstances and 12 
successfully minimize uncertainty in new cases. We conclude in Section 4 by reviewing empirical 13 
findings that support our view and by showing how direct learning, seen as instance of ecological 14 
rationality at work, is the core engine by which mere possibilities for action are turned into embodied 15 
know-how. Finally, we indicate the affinity between direct learning and sense-making activity.  16 
 17 
2. Ecological Information (or information for action) 18 
 19 
The notion of ecological information is central to understand perception and perceptual learning 20 
within the ecological approach to perception. This kind of information is at the same time 21 
nonrepresentational and nonsensorial, opening up a unique path to ecological psychology in the study 22 
of perception that doesn’t resemble traditional empiricist or cognitivist approaches. In order to capture 23 
the core features of ecological information, it will be helpful to contrast it with sensory stimulation. 24 
 25 
The concept of stimuli is used in different ways in psychology and physiology, and even within 26 
psychology there is no agreement about how it should be precisely defined (Gibson, 1960). For 27 
instance, “does a stimulus motivate the individual,” considered from the first-personal perspective, 28 
“or does it merely trigger a response,” (1960, p. 695) which could happen only at the subpersonal 29 
level? One may also wonder whether a stimulus necessitates or not a behavioral response. Finally, 30 
there has also been debate about whether a stimulus activates or not a sense organ, in other words, 31 
whether it’s effective or just potential (1960, p. 696). It seems that all depends on how far we want to 32 
go into the environment to explain changes—physiological, behavioral or dispositional—in the 33 
organism. In perceptual science, it’s common to assume that a stimulus is a form of physical energy—34 
optical, acoustical, mechanical or chemical—that, by exceeding a certain threshold, effectively 35 
activates a receptor (Gibson, 2015, p. 46). Sensory stimulation is then that passive process of receptor 36 
activation. The stimulus energy at issue is proximal, punctate and momentary, since it’s the immediate 37 
cause for the activation of a single receptor at a given time (Gibson, 1960, p. 698). 38 
 39 
Empiricist and cognitivist approaches to perception share the assumption that sensory stimulation 40 
provides the start point for the study of perception. They differ, however, in how they conceive 41 
perception. For the empiricist, perception boils down to the sensations that follow sensory stimulation 42 
and their associations, whereas, for the cognitivist, perception is about objects and events in our three-43 
dimensional environment, it produces perceptual states that represent the distal causes of sensory 44 
stimulation, as it is typically done in CSN. As the stimulus energy carries no information about the 45 
environment (Gibson, 1960, p. 699), it needs to be processed and enriched for the construction of 46 
these perceptual representations (Gibson, 2015, p. 240). 47 
 48 
Gibson rejects the assumption above, thereby, rejecting both the empiricist and cognitivist views of 49 
perception. In its place, he puts forward the view that, going deeper into the environment, we can find 50 
distal, structured and persisting potential stimulus, which he calls stimulus information (Gibson, 1968, 51 
p. 29, 2015, p. 47). The first thing to notice is that energy can be ordered and structured over time 52 
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and/or space. Differences of intensity may form a pattern in these two dimensions. For instance, a 1 
point of observation in ambient light has structure if the light at that point is different in different 2 
directions (2015, p. 45). Structure matters because it can specify the environment, in particular its 3 
source. In the case of ambient light, its “structure is locally predictable; that is, physics could, in 4 
principle, provide a point by point accounting of reflection and absorption” (Michaels and Carello, 5 
1981, pp. 21–22). Thus, the structure of ambient light specifies surfaces and their properties in that 6 
the former is lawfully related to the later. In a similar way, ambient light structured over time may 7 
specify patterns of change, namely, events. Information, in the ecological approach to perception, is 8 
just that relation of specification (Gibson, 1960, p. 702, 1968, p. 245, 2015, p. 231). Accordingly, 9 
stimulus information is structured energy to which an organism may be sensitive. Before we 10 
characterize in more detail how the organism becomes sensitive to stimulus information, some 11 
clarifications are in order. 12 
 13 
We mentioned in the last section that Gibson’s talk about information and, as we will soon discuss, 14 
the process of picking up information have raised concerns, mainly from radical enactivists (Hutto 15 
and Myin, 2017, p. 122), as to whether ecological psychology is radical enough and really 16 
uncommitted to representations. We think that these concerns are unfounded. The relation of 17 
specification upon which ecological information rests is nothing more than nomic covariation 18 
(Gibson, 1968, p. 244; Heras-Escribano, 2019, p. 150), which is a respectable naturalistic notion 19 
according to radical enactivists themselves (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 71, 2017, p. 67). For Gibson, 20 
it’s absolutely clear that ecological information is devoid of semantic or contentful information: “The 21 
connection between natural stimuli and their sources is not the same as the connection between social 22 
stimuli and their sources, for example, the connection between words and their referents. This latter 23 
problem, surely, is distinct. Semantics is one thing, ecology is another;” (Gibson, 1960, pp. 699–700). 24 
 25 
Ecological information is not present in any kind of covariation. First, a structure that specifies its 26 
source must be causally related to that source in that changes in the source are followed by changes 27 
in the structure. Accidental or casual covariation is unsafe for grounding organism’s perceptions and 28 
actions. Second, that relation of specification might be local, that is, the structure might specify its 29 
source only under certain conditions or, more precisely, in the organism’s niche. For instance, a 30 
bioelectric field that is “partially modulated in the rhythm of the living thing’s respiratory 31 
movements” (Turvey et al., 1981, p. 276) specifies an edible thing in the environment where sharks 32 
live, for “in the niche of the shark ‘an edible thing’ and ‘electric field of, say, type F’ are nomically 33 
related” (Turvey et al., 1981, p. 277). Thus, local covariation may be enough for specification. Finally, 34 
there has been a debate among ecological psychologists about whether the covariation must be strong 35 
enough to support a 1:1 specifying relationship or just a probabilistic specifying relationship 36 
(Bruineberg et al., 2018; Heras-Escribano and Pinedo, 2016). In the latter case the environmental 37 
structure does not uniquely specify its source because the correlation between them is not exception-38 
free. For instance, the covariation between smoke and fire is less than perfect in that the occurrence 39 
of the first makes the occurrence of the latter only likely. Bruineberg, Chemero and Rietveld 40 
distinguish between lawful and general ecological information to capture respectively strict and 41 
probabilistic covariation (Bruineberg et al., 2018, p. 6–7). Of course, the former is just a special case 42 
of the latter. What is up for grabs is whether probabilistic covariation is enough to support ecological 43 
information. On the one hand, there are plenty of non-strict regularities in the environment, natural 44 
or social, that could be useful to guide behavior. Having access to information that some event is 45 
likely is better than having no information whatsoever. On the other, general ecological information 46 
opens up the possibility of perceptual error. In those occasions in which an environmental structure 47 
is present but not its likely source, such as in the case of smoke without fire, an organism may pick 48 
up the general optical information about fire when there is no fire around. This would be a case of 49 
perceptual error. However, the ecological approach to perception is committed to direct perception, 50 
which precludes cases of perceptual error as traditionally conceived (Gibson, 1968, p. 287; Heras-51 
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Escribano and Pinedo, 2016, p. 581). Cases of misperception in the ecological approach are not cases 1 
of picking up information that fails to point to its source but cases of failing to pick up information. 2 
 3 
Giving up direct perception is an option, but it would presumably throw us back to empiricist or 4 
cognitivist views of perception (Gibson, 2015, p. 159). Besides, it’s hard to see how one could account 5 
for perceptual error without assuming a suspicious intermediate, maybe representational, between the 6 
perceiver and the world. We take a different path. Our first consideration is that the gap between 7 
general and lawful ecological information can be minimized by taking seriously the local aspect of 8 
regularities. In general, the occurrence of smoke may indeed make the occurrence of fire only likely, 9 
but it may uniquely specify fire in a particular environment. Organisms are not expected to be 10 
sensitive to information irrespective of where they find themselves, on the contrary, they might be 11 
able to manifest their sensibility to a piece of information only in their niches. Yet, even restricted to 12 
a niche there may be non-strict regularities that are useful to an organism. Thus our first consideration 13 
does not completely overthrow the distinction between general and lawful information. Our second 14 
consideration is that maybe what one perceives when one picks up general ecological information is 15 
an abstract fact about the likelihood of some type of event. Gibson always emphasized that an 16 
organism may be sensitive to complex and higher-order regularities (Gibson, 2015, p. 131), in fact, 17 
in his view, one can even perceive abstract entities: “there have to be modes of stimulation, or ways 18 
of conveying information, for any individual to perceive anything, however abstract” (Gibson, 1968, 19 
p. 26). Thus, considered in general, smoke specifies not fire but the likelihood of fire, and it may even 20 
specify that fire is more likely than anything else that might cause smoke in the organism’s niche. 21 
Certainly, the corresponding affordances of fire and of the likelihood of fire must differ. In any case, 22 
we submit that this path, which preservers ecological information as a 1:1 specifying relationship, is 23 
better than giving up direct perception. 24 
 25 
Ecological information has a dual nature, it is not only, as we have been discussing, information about 26 
the environment but also information for the organism. In fact, an environmental structure is 27 
information about something only because it is detectable and usable by an organism, but not because 28 
it is semantically laden as assumed in traditional CSN. Thus, ecological information is information 29 
in relation to an organism, it specifies both the environment and the organism (Gibson, 2015, p. 132). 30 
Let us unpack these claims. The organism needs to be considered in the study of information for three 31 
reasons. First, information, as a relevant category in behavioral explanations, cannot fulfill its 32 
function to point to something unless it is detectable. So, an energy pattern can be information for an 33 
organism only if the organism has sensory registers that are sensible to that kind of energy. Ultraviolet 34 
radiation, even if structured, is not information for beings like us, but it can be for honeybees. Second, 35 
the detection of energy structured over time and/or space depends on the organism’s abilities to 36 
explore its environment. Third, and more importantly, for information to be usable it must be detected 37 
in a way that is meaningful or intelligible to the organism. According to Gibson, what an organism 38 
perceives when it looks at objects is not their physical qualities but their affordances, what the 39 
organism can do with them (2015, p. 126). As perception is direct, ecological information must then 40 
specify affordances too (2015, p. 131). This result shouldn’t come as a surprise since organisms live 41 
not in the environment as such but in a particular niche, “a setting of environmental features that are 42 
suitable for an animal” (2015, p. 121). A kind of organism implies a kind of niche and vice versa, 43 
they are complementary, a niche “complements the variety of actions a species must perform.” 44 
(Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 44). Thus, the ecological information specifying those aspects or 45 
features of the environment that normally call the organism’s attention also specifies their 46 
affordances. When we focus on the affordances specified by the ecological information, information 47 
is personal, it is information for a species or for an individual. 48 
 49 
Take, for instance, the information for optical contact. This information specifies the time at which 50 
an object would collide with an observer. When an object is coming towards the observer, it 51 
progressively occupies a wider area of the observer’s visual field until the limit in which it occupies 52 
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the whole field, the moment of the collision. According to Gibson and a latter study of Lee (1976), 1 
the observer does not use information about the absolute speed and distance to calculate the time of 2 
contact, as a cognitivist would hypothesize. Rather, she directly picks up the rate of optical expansion 3 
of the object. This information is enough to guide the observer’s behavior because “the rate of 4 
magnification is proportional to the imminence of collision” (Gibson, 2015, p. 167). This example is 5 
interesting because it shows in a clear way the dual nature of ecological information. The rate of 6 
optical expansion of an object specifies a type of event, the approach-of-something (2015, p. 167). 7 
This is information about an event. At the same time, this information is body-scaled, it relates the 8 
approaching object to the observer’s visual field. Thus, the rate of expansion is also information for 9 
an organism inasmuch as it specifies possibilities for action, such as receding, deviating or preparing 10 
for collision. As Michaels and Carello put forward: 11 
 12 
As with the example of approaching, the flow of optical texture specifies what is 13 
happening (walking toward) and what is about to happen (imminence of collision). 14 
Beyond this, the actor requires that the information be in a usable form. This means that 15 
it must be specific to the animal (body-scaled) and specific to the animal’s particular 16 
environment. Perceptual information is specific to the event and compatible with the level 17 
of regulation involved in activity (Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 54). 18 
 19 
As said before, there is nothing contentful in the ecological notion of information about. We need to 20 
keep in mind that, according to the ecological psychology, perception is not a state of the organism 21 
considered in isolation from the environment but of the whole organism-environment system 22 
(Lombardo, 2017, p. 3; Richardson et al., 2008, p. 170). It’s only an organism coupled to the 23 
environment, living and enacting in its niche, that perceives. Only those aspects or features of the 24 
environment to which the organism is attuned in a practical way, by knowing how to deal with them, 25 
constitute the most immediate lived world of the organism, its niche, that region of the environment 26 
about which the organism can have perceptions. Although we can abstract structured energy from 27 
how it is detected by an organism, leaving out what that structured energy affords, the fact is that “for 28 
structured energy to qualify as information, an animal not only must have an ability to detect that 29 
information, it must also have a way to use it.” (Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 46). Thus, information 30 
for is the key to information about.3 31 
 32 
Finally, the ecological notion of information for and the ecological view of perceptual learning offer 33 
an interesting opportunity to approximate ecological psychology to enactivism. Assuming Shannon’s 34 
idea of information as minimization of uncertainty and the enactivist view of sense-making as the 35 
activity by which an autonomous system regulates its coupling with the environment in an adaptive 36 
way (Di Paolo, 2015), ecological psychology can bring both ideas together in its explanation of 37 
perceptual learning. For Eleanor Gibson and James Gibson, perceptual learning is a discriminative 38 
process by which the organism’s differential responses to ecological information get richer with 39 
practice (Gibson and Gibson, 1955, p. 39). Whenever learning is successful, the organism is “in closer 40 
touch with the environment” (1955, p. 34) in that it becomes attuned to information that specifies 41 
affordances of something in the environment. Understood in this way, perceptual learning is also a 42 
process of minimization of uncertainty in that the organism moves from a situation in which its 43 
environment is undifferentiated, an indefinite number of possibilities for action are on a par with each 44 
other, to a situation in which particular affordances show up to the organism. Becoming attuned to 45 
information that specifies affordances is how the organism gets away from uncertainty. As Eleanor 46 
 
3 We are pretty much in agreement with van Dijk et al. (2015) that talk on information about when divorced from 
information for can mistakenly lead us to think that ecological psychology is smuggling some kind of contentful notion 
into ecological theory. Energy patterns that are not used or at least usable by an organism are not information at all. At 
the	same time, we don’t need to bypass the dual aspect of information and forget that there is an objective aspect of the 
environment to which an organism is attuned when it is able to pick up affordances. 
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Gibson points out, “detecting unity, order, and redundancy are all ways of reducing uncertainty and 1 
of achieving specificity and economy.” (Gibson and Pick, 2000, p. 157).4  2 
 3 
3. Skilled agency and information 4 
 5 
The ecological notion of information provides the conceptual link between the idea of minimization 6 
of uncertainty, which is central to Shannon-information, and nomic variation or reliable covariation, 7 
which is the “scientifically reliable notion” endorsed by radical enactivists. So far, we have shown 8 
that, with due adjustments, these different views of information can be made to converge without 9 
implying representational content or semantically laden information. What is missing from this 10 
picture, however, is the role played by skilled agency in minimizing uncertainty. 11 
 12 
Since its early days, enactivists have emphasized the role played by agency in cognition. The initial 13 
motivation in Maturana and Varela’s work (1980) was to explain the distinctiveness of living 14 
organisms, with the additional supposition that whatever makes an organism a living one makes it a 15 
cognitive agent as well—which later became known as the strong life-mind continuity thesis (de 16 
Jesus, 2016), as endorsed for instance by some enactivists like Thompson (2007). Autopoiesis, the 17 
continuous production of the organism’s own components and its functional distinction from the 18 
outside environment, was thus conceived in order to explain the difference between agency and mere 19 
mechanic reaction. An autopoietic organism is constituted by a precarious network of interrelated that 20 
determines its own viability conditions through self-production, approaching favorable conditions for 21 
its existence and avoiding detrimental ones. This, however, is insufficient to explain agency, given 22 
that favorable and detrimental viability conditions can vary in degrees (Di Paolo, 2005). The fuller 23 
picture is that a cognitive organism is not only autopoietic but adaptive, that is, it improves its viability 24 
conditions by selecting more favorable environmental couplings and avoiding more detrimental ones, 25 
altering the set of parameters and conditions that affect the dynamic coupling between agent and 26 
environment (Di Paolo, Buhrmann & Barandiaran, 2017). We take this modulation of the system-27 
environment coupling to be a matter of conveying information, which can be understood at the 28 
personal level as skilled agency. 29 
 30 
Consider the following scenario: an inexperienced agent finds herself in a situation where she intends 31 
to do something. That can be achieved through certain actions that are available to her—however, 32 
due to her inexperience, she is uncertain about the outcome of any particular action in that 33 
environment. To add more details to that scenario, imagine a child using pointy cutlery for the first 34 
time with the intention to eat something on her plate, or a beginner piano student struggling to 35 
coordinate her hands while playing a scale. Plausibly, both are cases of intentional action, even though 36 
the agents in question may lack the ability to describe their intentions in a fine-grained manner. We 37 
recognize, therefore, a goal in their actions, and how well they perform depends on how close they 38 
get to achieve their goals. Importantly, their inexperience translates to uncertainty about the outcomes 39 
of specific actions vis-à-vis their goals, for they have a plethora of ways of acting and no means of 40 
choosing the most efficient or least costly ones. That is, unskilled agents cannot discriminate between 41 
more and less favorable environmental couplings for the achievement of specific goals. The child 42 
may hold the fork and the knife in a way that may be inefficient to cut the meal and bring it to her 43 
mouth, whereas there are many alternative ways to hold the fork and the knife which can be more or 44 
efficient than the way she does it—and she presently lacks the cognitive resources to make a decision 45 
for a better way. Similarly, the piano student may play the scale incorrectly or out of synch due to a 46 
way she is placing her fingers on the keys, thus failing to perceive that there is a more efficient way 47 
 
4 Perceptual learning yields a change in the organism-environment system (Szokolszky et al., 2019, p. 11), at the end of 
the process the organism and its environment are more coupled to each other than before. The higher the specificity 
achieved, the lower the uncertainty about which affordances are appropriate to the task at hand, and less effort and 
exploratory activities are necessary for the organism to satisfy its needs. In sum, “over learning and development, there 
is a continual increase in predictability and efficiency of perceiving what is doable.” (Adolph and Kretch, 2015, p. 130) 
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within the set of possible ways to play that scale in a piano with a certain weight to its keys, and so 1 
on.  2 
 3 
What the examples above show is that an inexperienced agent doesn’t perceive the relevant possible 4 
ways of acting as clearly and as well-defined as a more experienced agent would. A skilled agent, on 5 
the other hand, has established efficient ways of achieving specific goals in those circumstances (and 6 
sufficiently similar ones), which means that she is more certain that a specific way of acting has the 7 
desired outcome in those circumstances. Thus, skilled agency minimizes uncertainty, conveying more 8 
information for action—how someone should act, given those circumstances (and sufficiently similar 9 
ones) –, for the best way of doing something varies nomically with the intended outcome. Given that 10 
an agent’s performance is selected and refined in order to deal with specific circumstances, that is, it 11 
is developed through her engagements within her niche, the information conveyed is usually general 12 
rather than lawful, but it in cases of skilled performance it is also uniquely specified in those particular 13 
circumstances.  14 
 15 
The talk about uncertainty naturally leads to the question of whether we’re committed to an objective 16 
interpretation of uncertainty, according to which it is inherently probabilistically unmeasurable, or to 17 
a subjective interpretation, which intends to treat objective uncertainty as subjective estimations of 18 
specific outcomes for specific actions. The latter option would allow for uncertainty to be treated in 19 
the way risk sometimes is in economy and decision theory, that is, as a case in which each action 20 
leads to specific outcomes whose probabilities are known by the agent, but which are not certain. 21 
Naturally, a more suitable approach to the enactive-ecological view of information is the ecological 22 
interpretation of uncertainty put forth by Kozyreva and Hertwig (2019), which was inspired by 23 
bounded and ecological rationality (Simon, 1956; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). Their view is that 24 
uncertainty is a function of the systemic coupling between agent and environment, an emergent 25 
feature that depends on how the agent engages with her niche. What Kozyreva and Hertwig call 26 
“uncertainty as a property of the organism-environment system” is a needed change to the concept of 27 
uncertainty for the enactive-ecological approach of information, given that both enactivism and 28 
ecological psychology take the system comprised of agent interacting in an environment to be the 29 
fundamental unit of analysis. Thus, “uncertainty comprises both environmental unpredictability and 30 
uncertainties that stem from the mind’s boundaries, such as limits in available knowledge and 31 
cognitive capabilities” (Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2019). Our previous discussion shows that we should 32 
include skillfulness in the class of ‘cognitive capabilities’ that affect uncertainty, for, the more skillful 33 
the agent is, the more information she acquires from her surroundings. Moreover, as Kozyreva and 34 
Hertwig acknowledge, their view of uncertainty as an emergent feature of the agent-environment 35 
system leads to the idea that, in order to understand how the organism deals with uncertainty, it is 36 
crucial to understand her evolved cognitive capacities and the strategies she developed in order to 37 
engage with her environment. Conversely, the way the organism explores the information that is 38 
available for her depends not only on her skill, but also on her bodily morphology, both from the 39 
ontogenetic and the phylogenetic standpoints. Clearly, bodily morphology selects and restricts the set 40 
of possible actions an individual can undertake in order to achieve a certain goal, functioning as the 41 
most fundamental factor in the minimization of uncertainty.  42 
 43 
Aside from bodily morphology and skill, it should be clear due to our emphasis on intentional action 44 
that another variable to factor in the minimization of uncertainty is the practical interest, or simply 45 
the goals, of the agent in that environment. That the agent’s goals matter in information pick up is 46 
one of the morals to be drawn from Neisser and Blecken (1975) classic ballgame experiment, where 47 
subjects watched two superimposed videos of basketball players passing the ball and, given their task 48 
of counting the number of passes between players in one video, they typically didn’t notice “odd 49 
events”—which included, in replications of that experiment, a lady passing by with an umbrella and 50 
the famous gorilla. Experiments of selective attention therefore show that information that is plainly 51 
available to the agent is not picked up if it doesn’t affect her goals. Accordingly, individuals with 52 
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similar bodily morphologies and similar skill level can still perform widely different actions in the 1 
same environment given their goals. 2 
  3 
Now, if the skilled agent minimizes uncertainty about the outcomes of her actions, thus having a rich 4 
informational pickup going on, due to the limited set of actions she can undertake in order to 5 
accomplish a given task; it might look puzzling how the skilled agent is able to deal with unforeseen 6 
circumstances. After all, her skillfulness enables her to limit the set of possible actions, whereas 7 
unforeseen circumstances, at least the one’s that don’t relate to more familiar one’s, may as well call 8 
for new actions. So, paradoxically, it might seem that the skillful agent would be less apt to deal with 9 
new circumstances and environments. This is, in fact, plausible: the reliance upon habits, that is, 10 
patterns of engagement we reinforce in order to act more skillfully in familiar settings, may set us 11 
aback when we face new situations. But that is not to say that the unexperienced performer would be 12 
at an advantage, for she also would be greatly uncertain of the outcome of her actions in those 13 
circumstances. However, we speculate that in such cases the skilled agent would still be in a favorable 14 
position, because her skill enables her to operate at a higher order, perceiving the similarities between 15 
familiar environments and new ones, thus adapting previously selected pairs of actions/outcome to 16 
engage in new, more suitable actions. 17 
 18 
4. Direct Learning and minimization of uncertainty 19 
            20 
The literature on direct learning (Jacobs et al., 2000, 2001, 2009; Michaels et al., 2008) helps us to 21 
bring together and provide empirical support for some claims we did in the last two sections, namely, 22 
that agents perceive by picking up ecological information specific to affordances and that skilled 23 
agents minimize uncertainty about the outcomes of their actions. As we pointed out in Section 2, 24 
energy patterns may correlate with their respective sources in different degrees. However, according 25 
to the ecological approach, only a 1:1 specifying relationship supports direct perception. If this 26 
assumption about direct perception is correct, one can predict that learning to perceive “involves 27 
moving across the information manifold to a locus that permits better performance in the task,” 28 
(Michaels et al., 2008, 944) in other words, through perceptual learning one is expected to change 29 
from relying on nonspecifying variables (general ecological information) to specifying variables 30 
(lawful ecological information) when these are available and more useful to the task at hand. This 31 
should not come as a surprise, since skilled performance seems to require successful perception. We 32 
will discuss one study in which this result, convergence to use specifying variables after practice, was 33 
obtained. 34 
 35 
The study in question tracks the variable to pick up the relative mass of colliding balls (Jacobs et al., 36 
2009). Based on a prior study (Runeson, 1983) in which it was shown that the kinematics of linear 37 
collisions contain unambiguous information about kinetic properties, such as weight ratio, Jacobs et 38 
al. proposed a set of experiments to test whether novice and expert observers would differ in the 39 
kinematic information they use to perceive the relative mass of colliding balls (Jacobs et al., 2009, 40 
1019). At least three types of kinematic information about colliding balls are correlated with their 41 
relative masses. As pointed out by Runeson, the mass ratio of colliding balls is specified by the 42 
amount of velocity change, according to the following formula: m1/m2 = |v1 − u1|/|v2 − u2|, where 43 
m1 and m2 are the masses of the balls, u1 and u2 are the velocities of the balls before the collision, 44 
and v1 and v2 are the velocities of the balls after the collision. The amount of velocity change is a 45 
very useful variable because it highly correlates with mass ratio across different environments. Other 46 
two kinematic variables that might be highly correlated with mass ratios are the difference in exit 47 
speeds—the speeds of the balls after the impact—and the difference in scatter angles—the angles 48 
between a ball’s velocity before and after collision (Jacobs et al., 2001, 1019). These are 49 
nonspecifying variables in that they highly correlate with mass ratios only in some specific conditions. 50 
In Jacobs et al.’s experiments, collisions between balls were simulated by a computer and displayed 51 
in a screen to observers who were then instructed to estimate the relative mass of the colliding balls. 52 
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The experiments were designed to track learning, they consisted of three sets of trials: an initial 64-1 
trial pretest without feedback, followed by two 74-trial blocks of training with feedback—observers 2 
were informed about the correct mass ratios of the balls—, and a final 64-trial posttest without 3 
feedback. By tweaking the simulation, it was possible to set up a set of trials in which mass ratios 4 
were highly correlated with all three variables above. Thus, in one experiment they were able to test 5 
whether observers would change the variable they rely if it correlates highly with mass ratios. In this 6 
case, they did not, even those who started relying on nonspecifying variables (2001, 1023). In another 7 
experiment, with a different set of trials, where only the specifying variable correlated highly with 8 
mass ratios, the observers did change in the variables they used and converged on the specifying one 9 
(2001, 1032). A higher level of skilled performance was also observed in this case, as remarked by 10 
the authors: “Those observers who discover a specifying variable improve dramatically and reach 11 
high levels of performance” (2001, 1033).5 12 
 13 
These results back up some claims we did in the last two sections. We said that the distinction between 14 
general and lawful information could be minimized by taking in consideration local constraints. In 15 
fact, some “constraints are the necessary grantors of information” (2001, 1034), are grounded in laws 16 
and hold across different environments, whereas others are contingent and hold in a specific 17 
environment, but, whether global or local, they all support information that allows accurate 18 
performance in a task ecology.6 In the first experiment, the observers kept using the same 19 
nonspecifying variable they started with, the exit speeds, because in the simulated condition that 20 
variable was highly correlated with mass ratios and, therefore, was very useful for the task at hand. 21 
At the same time, as shown by the second experiment, observers converged to a more useful variable 22 
when it was available and the variables they started with were poorly correlated with mass ratios. 23 
Change of variable happens when the observer is not already attuned to her task. Thus, the general 24 
conclusion is that “observers merely search for variables that are useful in the ecology encountered 25 
in practice,” (2001, 1035) what can be achieved by relying on general or lawful information insofar 26 
as that information, given global or local constraints, is useful for the task at hand. 27 
 28 
Jacobs et al. finish their paper by advising that “great care must be taken in the selection of a stimulus 29 
set; otherwise, what may appear to be global cognitive principles can, in fact, be local solutions to 30 
local problems” (2001, 1035). However, one may draw a different moral from their results, namely 31 
and in resonance with our discussion in the last section, that cognition and rationality should be 32 
understood ecologically, as bounded by the environment, the task at hand, and the skills of the agent; 33 
as Kozyreva and Hertwig point out, “the essence of rational behavior consists in how an organism 34 
can adapt to achieve its goals under the constraints of its environment and its own cognitive 35 
limitations” (Kozyreva and Hertwig, 2019). Learning a perceptual skill is a process of adaptation to 36 
a discriminatory task, ecologically situated, whereby the agent becomes attuned to ecological 37 
information and minimizes the uncertainty of her couplings with the environment. As we have already 38 
pointed out in Sections 2 and 3, the range of possibilities for actions that can be successfully 39 
performed to achieve a goal or solve a task is determined and specified through perceptual learning. 40 
Uncertainty as unpredictability due to lack of knowledge, even probabilistic knowledge (Gigerenzer, 41 
2019), is thus minimized by turning, through practice, some hitherto mere possibilities for action, 42 
 
5 For another very interesting study with similar results, see (Michaels et al., 2008). In this study the aim is to track 
variables for perceiving the length of unseen rods through dynamic touch (Gibson, 1962). For instance, when wielding 
and hefting a rod one may become attuned to variables that correlate with rod length such as the first and the third principal 
moments of inertia, or a higher order variable that is a combination of the first two (Michaels et al., 2008, 946). As in 
Jacobs et al.’s study, they also concluded that “perceptual learning is guided by convergence information” (2008, 952). 
6 These considerations about the role of local and global constraints also handle the objection that progressive perceptual 
learning seems to be incompatible with direct perception, which is a matter of all or nothing. At each stage of learning, 
the agent is attuned to a different variable, changing from local to more global ones inasmuch as becoming more skillful 
in dealing with a task requires accurate performance in a wider range of circumstances. Perceptual learning is a matter of 
discovering more useful information (Runeson, 1983, 8). See also Michaels et al. discussion on information space (2008, 
946–947). 
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whose consequences were also unknown, into embodied know-how. The skillful agent who knows 1 
how to ϕ enacts a world where the consequences of her ϕ-ing are under her control and are felt as 2 
such. 3 
 4 
By approaching direct learning as an instance of ecological rationality at work, we also make it easier 5 
to see this process as close to sense-making activity, as we have already indicated in Section 2. Both 6 
are adaptive processes enacted by an agent. Gibson also characterizes direct learning as a process of 7 
education of attention (Gibson, 1968, 51; 2015, 235) by which the agent selects only information that 8 
is needed for accomplishing her goals (Gibson, 1968, 286) and whose outcome is the agent getting 9 
“in closer touch with the environment” (Gibson and Gibson, 1955, 34). This is not so far away from 10 
sense-making activity or “the capacity of an autonomous system to adaptively regulate its operation 11 
and its relation to the environment depending on the virtual consequences for its own viability as a 12 
form of life” (Di Paolo et al., 2018, 33), where adaptivity is understood as an agent’s ability to 13 
distinguish and select what is good and what is bad for the preservation of her own identity over time. 14 
We submit that enactive approaches could benefit by adopting the framework of ecological 15 
information, direct learning can be a helpful way to frame and explain, at least in part, the capacity 16 
behind sense-making activity; at the same time, we acknowledge that ecological psychology can 17 
improve its understanding of the organism-environment systems by encompassing the enactivist 18 
emphasis on agency (Stapleton, 2016, 326) and the role of the asymmetry between organism and 19 
environment, which lies on the side of the former, in explaining how an enacted world is brought 20 
forth, as we did in Section 3.  21 
 22 
5. Concluding Remarks 23 
 24 
We have argued that information, stripped of any semantic or contentful significance, can also be the 25 
bread and butter of the enactive-ecological research program. Shannon-information as minimization 26 
of uncertainty is well placed to work out a bridge between ecological psychology and enactivism. 27 
First, we have put forward the ecological view of information as a relation of specification based on 28 
covariation. Because of its dual nature, ecological information specifies its source and affordances 29 
for an organism. Ecological information is mainly for action. Then, based on the enactivist view of 30 
agency, we explained minimization of uncertainty as resulting from the skillful activity of an agent 31 
while pursuing her intended goals in a particular environment. This is compatible with the ecological 32 
view of information because, in fact, what the agent is doing is reducing the full range of available 33 
affordances to those that are effective for achieving her goals. New and unknown situations offer new 34 
opportunities for an agent to minimize uncertainty, which she faces with the help of her already 35 
acquired skills. We backed up this view of minimization of uncertainty by appealing to empirical 36 
literature on direct learning. Agents converge to use more useful and specifying variables, thus 37 
minimizing uncertainty, when their perceptual skills are improved by practice. We also indicated how 38 
close direct learning and sense-making activity are. Finally, we submit that enactivists should 39 
welcome ecological talk about information, since such talk enlightens the non-representational 40 
transactions between organism and environment; and ecological psychologists should forget Gibson's 41 
qualms about Shannon's view of information, for direct learning can be seen as a process of 42 
minimization of uncertainty. 43 
 44 
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